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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF NON-CASH INCENTIVES, PAYOFF TIMING, AND TASK TYPE ON
PERFORMANCE
BY

GREGORY PATRICK MCPHEE

APRIL 17, 2013

Committee Co-Chairs: Dr. R. Lynn Hannan (Co-Chair)
Dr. Ivo D. Tafkov (Co-Chair)
Major Academic Unit: Accounting
My study investigates whether the effects of non-cash incentives on employee performance depend on
when the incentive is paid and what type of task is being performed. Although firms frequently use noncash incentives, such as merchandise, travel awards and gift cards, the effects of non-cash incentives,
relative to cash incentives, are not well understood by researchers. Drawing on economic and psychology
theories, I predict that the effects of incentive type (cash or non-cash) on performance depend on
incentive payoff timing (near or distant future) and task type (analytic or creative). Specifically, for an
analytic task, I predict and find that a cash incentive paid in the near future is most effective. For a
creative task, I predict and find that a cash incentive paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive paid
in the distant future are most effective. The results of my study should benefit theory and practice by
identifying the most effective combination of incentive type and payoff timing for a given task type.

ix

I. INTRODUCTION
Research has found that up to 67 percent of firms motivate employees using non-cash
incentives such as merchandise, travel awards and gift cards (Incentive Federation 2011).
Despite the widespread use of non-cash incentives, little is known about how they affect
employee behavior (Jeffrey 2009; Presslee et al. 2013). Because non-cash incentives are
frequently used by firms but are not well understood by researchers, it is important to identify
factors that influence their effectiveness compared to an economic benchmark of cash incentives.
Knowing when non-cash incentives are equally as effective as cash incentives is important since
non-cash incentives are often less expensive than their retail cash equivalents (Oyer 2008).
I predict that the effect of incentive type (cash or non-cash) on employee performance
depends on incentive payoff timing (near or distant future) and task type (analytic or creative).
When employees are performing analytic tasks, I predict that cash paid in the near future will be
the most effective incentive type and payoff timing combination. When employees are
performing creative tasks, I predict that cash paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive
paid in the distant future will be the two most effective incentive type and payoff timing
combinations. Finally, I pose the research question of whether a cash incentive with a near future
payoff or a non-cash incentive with a distant future payoff is the most effective incentive type
and payoff timing combination when employees are performing a creative task.
These predictions are based on economic and psychology theories. Conventional
economic theory suggests that a cash incentive paid in the near future is the most effective
incentive type and payoff timing combination regardless of task type (Samuelson 1937;
Koopman 1960; Baker et al. 1988). Cash incentives are more effective than non-cash incentives
because cash is fungible and has greater value in exchange (Baker et al. 1988). Near future

payoffs are more effective than distant future payoffs because individuals generally discount near
future events less than distant future events (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960).
In contrast to conventional economic theory, psychology theory suggests that the effect
of incentive type on performance will depend on how a particular incentive type and payoff
timing combination is conceptualized by the employee and whether this conceptualization
activates an information processing orientation that is appropriate for a particular task (Liberman
and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003; Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al.
2010). Construal Level Theory (CLT) suggests that individuals conceptualize future events either
concretely or abstractly depending on the characteristics and timing of the event (Liberman and
Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003). To the extent that a future event is concretely
conceptualized (because it is characterized by specific details and is anticipated to occur in the
near future), individuals will adopt a localized information processing orientation that is well
suited to performing analytic tasks (Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al. 2010).
To the extent that a future event is abstractly conceptualized (because it is characterized by
general characteristics and is anticipated to occur in the distant future), individuals will adopt a
global information processing orientation that is well suited to performing creative tasks (Forster
et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007 Malkoc et al. 2010).
This study draws on CLT to argue that the effect of incentive type on performance will
depend on whether a particular incentive type and payoff timing combination is concretely or
abstractly conceptualized and whether this conceptualization activates an information processing
orientation that is well-suited for a particular task. When employees conceptualize an incentive
payoff concretely, due to the detailed characteristics of the incentive and the immediacy of the
payoff (e.g. cash incentive paid in near future), employees will process information in a
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localized, piecemeal fashion. This localized processing orientation is well-suited for performing
structured, analytic tasks such as parts assembly or matching vendors’ invoices to purchase
orders. When employees conceptualize an incentive abstractly, due to the general characteristics
of the incentive and the deferral of the payoff (e.g. dream vacation redeemed in the distant
future), employees will adopt a global, holistic information processing orientation. This global
information processing orientation is well-suited for performing unstructured, creative tasks such
as new product development.
Incentive type, payoff timing and task type are also important to practice because they
are under the firm’s control and have an impact on employee and firm performance (Holmstrom
and Milgrom 1991; Kole 1997; Prendergast 1999; Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Oyer 2008;
Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010; Backes-Gellner and Tuor 2010; Eaton and Rosen 2012). For
example, firms manage incentive type by using non-cash incentives to reduce compensation
costs (Oyer 2008) and to attract and retain specific types of employees (Backes-Gellner and Tuor
2010).1 Firms manage payoff timing by deferring compensation in order to prevent employees
from engaging in short-term manipulation of the incentive scheme and to improve retention of
desirable employees (Prendergast 1999; Eaton and Rosen 2012). Firms manage task type by
combining different tasks and task attributes into a single job in order to improve operating
efficiency and incentive scheme effectiveness (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Kachelmeier et
al. 2008; Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010).
This study investigates how incentive type, incentive payoff timing and task type affect
performance using a 2 x 2 x 2 between-group, within-subjects, mixed design. It manipulates
incentive type between subjects by varying the type of performance bonus participants receive
1

For example, only outdoor enthusiasts are likely to be attracted by REI, the outdoor equipment retailer, offering
employees discounts on outdoor recreation equipment and free equipment rentals
(http://www.rei.com/jobs/pay.html).
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(cash or non-cash). The study manipulates incentive payoff timing between subjects by varying
when the participants receive their performance bonus (near future or distant future). It
manipulates task type within subjects by having participants perform both analytic and creative
tasks. The primary dependent variable is task performance which measures each participant’s
overall performance on each task.
Consistent with these predictions, the effects of incentive type on performance depend on
incentive payoff timing and task type. When performing an analytic task, the most effective
combination of incentive type and payoff timing is cash paid in the near future. When
performing a creative task, the most effective combinations of incentive type and payoff timing
are cash paid in the near future and non-cash incentives paid in the distant future.
The study has important implications for practice because it identifies when non-cash
incentives can be substituted for cash incentives without a reduction in employee performance.
Specifically, results demonstrate that while cash paid in the near future is most effective for an
analytic task, a non-cash incentive paid in the distant future is as effective as cash paid in the
near future for a creative task. Knowing when non-cash incentives are as effective as cash is
important because non-cash incentives are often less expensive to firms than their retail cash
equivalents (Oyer 2008). Non-cash incentives are often less expensive because firms can
purchase them at wholesale prices and award them to employees at retail prices.
This study also contributes to accounting research in several ways. First, it provides
insights into the effects of non-cash incentives on performance which is important since this
incentive type is used by up to 67 percent of firms but is not well understood by researchers
(Incentive Federation 2011; Presslee et al. 2013). Second, it contributes to accounting research
by showing how both economic preferences and information processing effects can affect
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employee performance and incentive scheme effectiveness (Bonner et al. 2000; Bonner and
Sprinkle 2002). By showing that the effect of incentive type on performance depends on payoff
timing and task type, the study complements conventional economic theory, a set of arguments
that implies that cash paid in the near future is the most effective combination regardless of task
type (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960; Baker et al. 1988). Finally, the present study contributes
to a growing body of research related to the effect of incentives on the performance of creative
tasks, a topic that has been identified as being an important area for future accounting research
(Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical
background and develops the hypotheses. Section III describes the experimental design. Section
IV presents the results of the experiment. Section V summarizes the study’s main findings and
implications.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Effects of Non-cash Incentives on Performance
Non-cash incentives are incentives, such as merchandise, travel awards and retail gift
cards, that have monetary value but cannot be readily exchanged into an equivalent cash amount
(Incentive Federation Inc. 2007; Long and Shields 2010; Presslee et al. 2013). 2 Although noncash incentives are extensively used across industries and functional areas and have an estimated
annual cost of $46 billion, they are not well understood by accounting researchers (Incentive
Federation Inc. 2007; Presslee et al. 2013). To address this gap in the accounting literature, this
study investigates the effect of non-cash incentives on employee performance compared to an
2

Some non-cash incentives are symbolic and have no monetary value such as employee recognition awards and
plaques (Long and Shields 2010). In contrast, non-cash incentives are defined here as non-cash awards that have
monetary value in order to be consistent with prior accounting studies (e.g., Presslee et al. 2013) and because it
allows me to directly compare their performance effects with the performance effects of equivalently valued cash
incentives.

5

economic benchmark of cash incentives. It is important to examine factors affecting the
effectiveness of different incentive types because incentives can influence how employees use
accounting information (see Bonner and Sprinkle 2002 for a review).
This study builds on Presslee et al. (2013) who find that employees awarded non-cash
incentives have greater goal commitment than employees awarded cash incentives but set less
challenging goals and perform at a lower level (Presslee et al. 2013). Employees awarded noncash incentives have greater goal commitment because non-cash incentives have greater hedonic
appeal than cash incentives (Jeffrey 2009). Employees awarded non-cash incentives set less
challenging goals because they are more loss averse as a result of how they mentally account for
each incentive type (Thaler 1999; Kahneman 2003; Presslee et al. 2013). Employees awarded noncash incentives are more loss averse because prospective losses have a disproportionately large
effect on non-cash incentive mental accounts, which are relatively smaller and used less
frequently than cash incentive mental accounts (Presslee et al. 2013). Employees awarded noncash incentives perform at a lower level because task performance and goal difficulty often have
a positive relationship, i.e., setting less difficult goals results in lower performance (Locke and
Latham 1990; Bonner and Sprinkle 2002).
This study extends Presslee et al. (2013) by using economic and psychology theories to
predict the circumstances under which non-cash incentives can have similar performance effects
as cash incentives despite differences in mental accounting. While conventional economic theory
implies that cash incentives paid in the near future will be the most effective incentive type and
payoff timing combination regardless of task type (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960; Baker et al.
1988), Construal Level Theory (CLT) suggests that the effect of incentives on performance will
also depend on information processing effects unrelated to employees’ economic preferences
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(Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003; Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007;
Malkoc et al. 2010).
2.2 Economic Effects of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing on Performance
Conventional economic theory suggests that a cash incentive paid in the near future is the
most effective incentive type and payoff timing combination regardless of task type (Taylor
1914; Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960; Ainslie 1975; Smith 1976; Baker et al. 1988; Frederick
et al. 2002; Peterson and Luthans 2006; Long and Shields 2010). According to this viewpoint,
cash incentives are more effective than non-cash incentives because cash is fungible and has
greater value in exchange (Baker et al. 1988; Peterson and Luthans 2006). Cash incentives are
thought to be more effective because employees derive utility from being able to independently
choose how to spend their cash bonuses while they are constrained in how they spend their noncash bonuses (Peterson and Luthans 2006). Finally, cash incentives are more effective than noncash incentives because employees’ utilities for monetary rewards are non-satiable and
characterized by a “monotone increasing function of the monetary reward” (Smith 1976).3 That
cash incentives can be effectively used by firms to motivate employees is evidenced by the longstanding practice of companies using monetary incentives to induce or reward desired employee
behavior (Taylor 1914).4
Near future payoffs are more effective than distant future payoffs as individuals discount
near future events less than distant future events and individuals have a psychological preference
3

Smith’s postulate of non-satiation posits that when an individual is provided a choice between two alternative
rewards, the individual will choose to receive the alternative that offers the higher monetary value. This postulate
assumes that the cost of the two alternatives is identical.
4
Although monetary incentives can decrease task performance due to the incentives crowding out intrinsic interest
(e.g. Fessler 2003), the evidence is inconclusive. For effort-sensitive, non-creative tasks, cash incentives often have
a positive effect on task performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). For creative tasks, where intrinsic interest is
thought to have a more significant impact on performance, monetary incentives can still positively affect
performance (Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Reeves and Read 2009). For example, Kachelmeier et al. (2008) show that
piece rate monetary incentives can increase weighted creative productivity and Reeves and Read (2009) speculate
that the use of monetary incentives may activate greater excitement and task engagement.
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for immediate consumption over deferred consumption (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960;
Ainslie 1975; Frederick et al. 2002). Individuals discount near future events less than distant
future events because, ceteris paribus, events taking place in the near future are more likely to
have a greater impact on the individual’s immediate well-being than events taking place in the
distant future.5,6 Individuals prefer immediate consumption over deferred consumption due to
psychological preferences for immediacy that arise from ‘visceral’ factors related to
impulsiveness, impatience and a desire for instant gratification (Ainslie 1975; Frederick et al.
2002).7
2.3 Conceptualizing Incentives and Effects of Payoff Timing
In this section, this study examines how cash and non-cash incentives can be concretely
or abstractly conceptualized and how these conceptualizations are be affected by incentive
payoff timing. Examining how different incentive type and payoff timing combinations are
conceptualized is useful because CLT suggests that concrete and abstract conceptualizations of
future events affect how task-related information is processed (Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al.
2007; Malkoc et al. 2010).

5

The discounted utility model formalizes intertemporal discounting by transforming future well-being into a present
value based on an individual’s time preference, i.e., discount rate. Individuals’ time preferences, as evidenced in
their implicit discount rates, are not constant and often decline over time, i.e., hyperbolic discounting (Thaler 1981;
Frederick et al. 2002). Variation in the discount rates over different time horizons indicates that individuals are more
sensitive to differences in the time horizons of events taking place in the near future but are less sensitive to
differences in the time horizons of events taking place in the distant future.
6
Discounted utility theory is particularly relevant to accounting settings because it provides the theoretical
foundation for the time value of money calculations that are commonly found in accounting textbooks (e.g.,
Horngren et al. 2003).
7
There are instances when individuals may derive utility from postponing consumption (Loewenstein 1987; Nowlis
et al. 2004). This occurs when the individual enjoys not only the experience of consumption but also the anticipation
of consumption, i.e., anticipatory pleasure.
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2.3.1 Construal Level Theory and Psychological Distance
CLT suggests that individuals conceptualize future events either concretely or abstractly
depending on the perceived psychological distance between the individual and the event
(Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003; Trope and Liberman 2010). When future
events are perceived as being psychologically near, they are conceptualized concretely in terms
of localized details and practicality. When future events are perceived as being psychologically
distant, they are conceptualized abstractly in terms of general characteristics and ideals. For
example, when reading the Wall Street Journal is perceived as being psychologically near, the
act of reading is concretely conceptualized as turning pages and visually scanning rows of letters.
Alternatively, when reading the Wall Street Journal is perceived as being psychologically
distant, the act of reading is abstractly conceptualized as obtaining valuable, but “far off”
business information, information that can be used, for example, to improve future business
decisions and enhance career prospects.
Although perceived psychological distance is affected by a range of factors, temporal
distance has been identified as being particularly important (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope
and Liberman 2003; Trope et al. 2007). Events taking place in the near future are perceived as
being psychologically near and are concretely conceptualized in terms of specific details and
immediate practicality. Events taking place in the distant future are perceived as being
psychologically distant and are abstractly conceptualized in terms of general characteristics and
overall desirability (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003). For example, when a
manager perceives attending an out-of-town meeting as being psychologically near in that the
meeting will be held the next day, most managers will concretely conceptualize the meeting in
terms of specific details such as the departure time of the airplane and the address of the meeting
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location. In contrast, when a manager perceives attending an out-of-town meeting as being
psychologically distant, as, for instance, a meeting that will be held in three months, most
managers conceptualize the meeting abstractly in terms of general attributes such as whether
attending the meeting is strategically beneficial.
2.3.2 Conceptualizing Incentives
This study applies CLT to a setting where incentives are either cash or non-cash. Cash
and non-cash incentives can be situated along a concrete-abstract continuum depending on their
perceived psychological distance. Cash incentives are psychologically near and concretely
conceptualized because cash is the most frequently used method of payment in point-of-sale
retail transactions and is the most practical, immediately useful form of compensation (Baker et
al. 1988; Arango et al. 2011). In contrast, non-cash incentives are psychologically distant and
abstractly conceptualized because non-cash incentives, such as vacations to exotic destinations,
are often luxuries that employees do not routinely experience (Jeffrey 2009). Non-cash
incentives are also more psychologically distant because they often have no immediate practical
use and are frequently incorporated into abstract retail reward point programs (Alonzo 1996;
Presslee et al. 2013).
Although the current study draws on CLT to situate cash and non-cash incentives on a
concrete-abstract continuum depending on their psychological distance, it differs from prior CLT
research. No other CLT study has examined how different incentives are conceptualized and
whether the effect of incentives on behavior is consistent with CLT predictions. Moreover, in
this study CLT is being applied to a setting that involves actual economic incentives and this is
advantageous because behavior predicted by psychological theories may not generalize well to
settings where economic incentives are provided (Grether and Plott 1979; Smith 1991).
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While CLT suggests that individuals’ conceptualizations of future events, such as
receiving an incentive bonus, can be affected by the characteristics of the event itself, these
conceptualizations are also affected by the timing of the event (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope
and Liberman 2003). In the next section, I examine how employees’ conceptualizations of
different incentive types are affected by incentive payoff timing.
2.3.3 Effects of Incentive Payoff Timing on How Incentives Are Conceptualized
This research applies CLT to a setting where incentives are paid in either the near or
distant future. The effects of incentive payoff timing on how employees conceptualize incentives
are examined as CLT suggests that temporal distance affects perceived psychological distance.
When firms pay incentives in the near future, employees are likely to conceptualize the
incentives more concretely and in greater detail because the payment is psychologically near. By
way of contrast, when firms pay incentives in the distant future, employees are more likely to
conceptualize the incentives more abstractly and in more general terms because the payment is
psychologically distant. This distinction between near and distant future payoffs is particularly
relevant to accounting research because although different payoff timings can have different
performance effects, most incentive studies only examine incentive schemes with near future
payoffs (i.e., less than a month) (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Condly et al. 2003).8
Although this study draws on CLT to analyze how incentive payoff timing can affect how
employees conceptualize different incentive types, it differs from prior CLT research that

8

Employee perceptions of incentives can also be affected by incentive payoff timing due to the effects of
anticipatory pleasure which is described above (Loewenstein 1987; Nowlis et al. 2004). Employee perceptions of
incentives can also be affected by incentive payoff timing due to cognitive processing effects (Loewenstein 1987;
Kida and Smith 1995; Nowlis et al. 2004; Mercer 2005). Incentive payoff timing can affect how employees process
incentive-related information because individuals tend to rely more on cognitive-based judgments for shorter time
horizons and affect-based judgments for longer time horizons (Kida and Smith 1995; Mercer 2005). The effects of
incentive payoff timing on how incentives are perceived are examined in greater detail in the Supplementary
Analysis section.
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examines the effects of time. While most CLT studies take place in settings involving imaginary
future events (e.g. Trope and Liberman 1998; Liberman et al. 2002), this study takes place in a
setting involving a real future event, i.e., an incentive bonus payoff. It is helpful to use a realistic
future event when studying the effects of time because individuals often respond differently to
realistic vs. hypothetical events, particularly when financial incentives are involved (Smith 1991;
Coller and Williams 1999; Brosig et al. 2003; Nowlis et al. 2004).
In the previous two sections, incentive type and payoff timing are described with respect
to their independent effects on how employees conceptualize incentives. In the next section,
incentive type and payoff timing are described with respect to their joint effect on how
employees conceptualize incentives due to (mis)matching of psychological distances.
2.3.4 Matching of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing
Because incentive payoff timing can affect the extent to which an incentive is concretely
or abstractly conceptualized, it is important to identify the joint effects of different incentive type
and payoff timing combinations. When the psychological distance of the incentive type
“matches” the psychological distance of the incentive payoff timing, employees are likely to
conceptualize the combination either concretely or abstractly. For example, when a cash
incentive is matched with a near future payoff, employees concretely conceptualize the
combination because cash incentives and near future payoffs are both psychologically near.
When a non-cash incentive is matched with a distant future payoff, employees abstractly
conceptualize the combination because non-cash incentives and distant future payoffs are both
psychologically distant. In contrast, employees are likely to conceptualize an incentive type and
payoff timing combination more neutrally when there is a “mismatch” between incentive type
and payoff timing due to the offsetting effects of psychological distance. These offsetting effects
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occur when a cash incentive is mismatched with a distant future payoff and non-cash incentives
are mismatched with a near future payoff.
Having described the joint effects of different incentive type and payoff timing
combinations, I next predict how these combinations affect task performance. Because different
incentive type and payoff timing combinations activate different information processing
orientations and because some information processing orientations are better suited for some
tasks than for others, I predict that the joint effect of incentive type and payoff timing on task
performance depends on task type.
2.4 Effects of Incentive Type, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance
This section examines how different incentive type and payoff timing combinations
affect task performance by influencing how employees process task-related information.
Investigating the effects of different incentive type and payoff timing combinations on task
performance is a contribution because some combinations improve performance of some tasks
while impairing performance of other tasks.
2.4.1 Information Processing and Task Type
CLT research indicates that the characteristics and timing of a future event can affect how
an individual conceptualizes the event, which, in turn, affects whether a local or global
information processing orientation is adopted (Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007). When an
event is concretely conceptualized because of its detailed, practical characteristics and near
future timing, individuals process information in a localized, piecemeal fashion (Forster et al.
2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al. 2010). When an event is abstractly conceptualized because
of its general characteristics and distant future timing, individuals process information in a
global, holistic fashion (Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007 Malkoc et al. 2010).
13

The effects of local and global information processing on task performance depend on
what type of task is being performed (Schooler et al. 2002; Forster 2004). A local information
processing orientation can improve performance of tasks that require detailed analysis and
following step-by-step procedures. A global information processing orientation can improve
performance of tasks that require insight and creativity.
Distinguishing between different types of tasks impacts accounting research in that prior
studies have shown that incentive scheme effectiveness can vary depending on whether the task
is a highly-structured, analytic task or a loosely-structured, creative task (Bonner and Sprinkle
2002; Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010). While incentives can
positively affect performance of effort-sensitive analytic tasks, incentives can negatively affect
performance of creative tasks by “crowding out” intrinsic task interest (Deci et al. 1999; Bonner
and Sprinkle 2002; Fessler 2003; Kachelmeier et al. 2008). Firms benefit from distinguishing
between analytic and creative tasks because firms frequently combine different task types and
task attributes into a single job which can enhance or diminish the overall effectiveness of the
incentive scheme (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).
2.4.2 Effects of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing on Analytic and Creative Task Performance
The thesis experimental setting includes different incentive type and payoff timing
combinations. These combinations can be conceptualized concretely or abstractly. When the
combination is concretely conceptualized (because a cash incentive is matched with a near future
payoff), employees are more likely to adopt a localized information processing orientation
characterized by attention to details, practicality and feasibility. When the combination is
abstractly conceptualized (because a non-cash incentive is matched with a distant future payoff),
employees are inclined to adopt a globalized information processing orientation characterized by
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attention to generalities and overall desirability. When cash incentives are mismatched with
distant future payoffs or non-cash incentives are mismatched with near future payoffs,
information processing is likely to be impeded or disrupted because of offsetting effects.
When performing an analytic task, the most effective incentive type and payoff timing
combination should be cash that is paid in the near future. This prediction is consistent with
conventional economic and psychological theories. It is consistent with economic theory where
cash is frequently viewed as being the most practical, immediately useful form of compensation
and individuals generally prefer immediate consumption over deferred consumption (Samuelson
1937; Koopman 1960; Baker et al. 1988; Frederick et al. 2002). It is consistent with construal
and information processing theories because the matching of cash incentives with a near future
payoff can activate a concrete information processing orientation that is well-suited to
performing detail-oriented, analytic tasks (Liberman and Trope 1998; Schooler et al. 2002; Trope
and Liberman 2003; Forster et al. 2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al. 2010; Trope and
Liberman 2010). This line of argumentation leads to the following hypothesis:
H1:

For analytic tasks, a cash incentive with a near future payoff is the most effective
combination of incentive type and payoff timing.

When performing a creative task, the most effective incentive type and payoff timing
combinations should be a cash incentive that is paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive
that is paid in the distant future. This prediction is consistent with there being separate economic
and information processing effects. It is consistent with economic theory, as described above, in
that cash is the most practical, immediately useful form of compensation and individuals
generally prefer immediate consumption over deferred consumption (Samuelson 1937; Koopman
1960; Baker et al. 1988; Frederick et al. 2002). This prediction is also consistent with
psychological theory where the matching of a non-cash incentive with a distant future payoff can
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activate an abstract information processing orientation that is well-suited to performing creative
tasks (Liberman and Trope 1998; Schooler et al. 2002; Trope and Liberman 2003; Forster et al.
2004; Trope et al. 2007; Malkoc et al. 2010; Trope and Liberman 2010). Given this line of
thinking, I posit:
H2:

For creative tasks, a cash incentive with a near future payoff and a non-cash
incentive with a distant future payoff are the most effective combinations of
incentive type and payoff timing.

Finally, the research question of whether a cash incentive with a near future payoff or a
non-cash incentive with a distant future payoff is the most effective incentive type and payoff
timing combination for a creative task can be posed. Economic and psychological theories make
different predictions about employee performance. Economic theory predicts that cash incentives
paid in the near future will be most effective due to the economic preferences of the employees.
CLT predicts that non-cash incentives paid in the distant future will be most effective since the
matching of a non-cash incentive with a distant future payoff activates a global information
processing orientation that is well-suited to performing creative tasks. Therefore, the following
contingent research question can be articulated:
RQ1: For creative tasks, will a cash incentive with a near-future payoff or a non-cash
incentive with a distant future payoff be more effective?
III. METHOD
3.1 Experimental Design and Task Description
A laboratory experiment has been selected as the most appropriate method for examining
the contravening effects of incentives, payoff timing perceptions, and task type. It employs a 2 x
2 x 2 between-group, within-subjects, mixed design in which incentive type, incentive payoff
timing, and task type are each manipulated at two levels. The first independent variable,
incentive type, is manipulated between subjects at the cash or non-cash levels. The second
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independent variable, incentive payoff timing, is manipulated between subjects at the near future
or distant future levels. The third independent variable, task type, is manipulated, within subjects,
at the two levels of analytic or creative task type. Participants perform each task for five rounds
after completing one practice round per task. The unit of analysis was total performance for each
task over five rounds.
There are two dependent variables, depending on the task type, “problems solvedanalytic” and “problems solved-creative.” For each task, problems-solved is measured as the
total number of problems solved across all five performance rounds.
3.2 Experimental Procedures
Participants perform two tasks at their individual computer terminal as described in the
experiment timeline shown in Figure 1.9 The tasks consist of alpha-numeric decoding problems
and creative word association problems. The order of the tasks is randomized to control for order
effects.
Insert Figure 1 here
After receiving instructions and taking a comprehension check quiz, participants began
the first task. Participants started the task by performing a two and a half minute practice round
that consisted of four practice problems. Upon completing the practice round, participants
responded to questions related to their perceptions of the task. Participants were then provided
information describing their performance bonuses and were required to correctly answer all
questions on the performance bonus quiz before proceeding.
Once participants successfully passed the performance bonus quiz, they completed five,
three-minute performance rounds with each round consisting of nine problems. Participants
received performance feedback after completing each round. Feedback consisted of the bonus
9

The experiment was programmed using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007).
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amount earned that period. For every problem correctly solved, participants earned either $1 or 1
Lifestyle Rewards point depending on their incentive type condition. Upon completing the first
task, the participants answered additional questions related to their perceptions of the task. These
instrument items, along with the practice round questions, are asked in order to assess whether
incentive type and payoff timing crowd out participants’ intrinsic task interest (e.g., Fessler
2003).
Following the completion of the first task, participants were given a distractor task that
consisted of providing demographic information. The distractor task helps to avoid cognitive
processing effects activated during the first task from spilling over and affecting performance
during the second task. Participants then completed the second task, which was organized
identically to the first task. After completing the second task, they filled out a post-experimental
questionnaire, received a $5 show-up fee and were given a receipt for their performance bonus.
In order to collect their performance bonuses, all participants had to return for a second
session. The date of the second session was determined by participants’ incentive payoff timing
condition, i.e., one day or six weeks following the first session. During the second session,
participants completed a second post-experimental questionnaire, received another $5 show-up
fee and were paid the bonus that they earned during the first session The average performance
bonus earned by each participant was approximately $25.
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3.3 Incentive Type
Incentive type was manipulated between subjects at two levels as shown in Appendix A:
cash or non-cash. In the cash incentive condition, participants were informed that they could earn
a cash bonus based on their performance. The cash incentive manipulation contained a written
description of the cash incentive as well as three images of cash. Images of cash were included in
the manipulation in order to make the incentive more salient and to maintain consistency with
the non-cash incentive condition which contains images of three retail store logos.
In the non-cash incentive condition, participants earned Lifestyle Rewards points based
on their performance. The non-cash incentive manipulation contained a written description of the
non-cash incentives as well as images of the logos of the three retailers included in the Lifestyle
Rewards program. Images of the non-cash incentives were included in the manipulation in order
to make the incentives more salient and to maintain consistency with the cash incentive
condition.
Participants in the non-cash incentive condition converted Lifestyle Reward points,
which were earned during the experiment, into retail gift cards that could be used at AMC
Theaters, Cheesecake Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods. These three retailers were selected for
the Lifestyle Rewards program because pretesting indicated that college-age students find these
retailers attractive and are associated with entertainment and recreation. The Lifestyle Rewards
program was more abstract than cash because the retailers used in the program provided goods
and service that are non-essential luxuries that students typically do not use every day. Similarly,
the Lifestyle Rewards program was more abstract than cash since the incentive scheme itself
consists of an abstract point system that requires the conversion of Lifestyle Rewards points into
a retail dollar amount.
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3.4 Payoff Timing
Payoff timing was manipulated between subjects at two levels: near future or distant
future. In the near-future payoff condition, participants received their bonus payments one day
following the experiment. In the distant-future payoff condition, participants received their bonus
payments six weeks following the experiment. Participants in both conditions were required to
return to the same bonus distribution location to collect their bonuses in order to ensure that
participants across conditions exerted the same level of effort. This design feature rules out the
possibility that differences in the anticipated effort required to collect future bonus payments
affects performance. The one day and six week payoff delays effectively operationalized the near
and distant future time constructs as evidenced by pre-test results where individuals consistently
viewed one day as being closer in time than six weeks (t = 3.28; p < 0.01; two-tailed).
3.5 Task Type
Task type was manipulated within subjects at two levels as shown in Appendix B:
analytic and creative. In the analytic task condition, participants performed alpha-numeric
decoding consisting of 10 numbers per problem that need to be decoded into letters. The alphanumeric decoding task is frequently used in accounting studies as an effort-sensitive task (Chow
1983; Church et al. 2008). Different decoding keys are used each round to avoid possible
performance effects associated with participants memorizing the decoding key. Alpha-numeric
decoding effectively operationalized the analytic task construct because it involved highly
detailed information processing whereby the correct solution can be arrived at using a direct,
algorithmic problem solving approach (see Ashton 1990 for discussion of task characteristics).
In the creative task condition, participants solved Remote Associate Test problems which
are creative word problems that require participants to provide a word that links three seemingly
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unrelated words (Mednick 1962, Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003). For example, the three words
“Cottage-Swiss-Cake” are related by the word “Cheese.” The Remote Associate Test problems
effectively operationalized the creative task construct because it involved highly abstract
information processing whereby the correct solution could only be obtained using an indirect,
heuristic problem solving approach. Remote Associate Test problems are frequently used as
measures of individual creativity (Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003).
3.6 Participants
Eight computerized sessions were held in an experimental economics laboratory at a
large university in the Southeast United States. Fourteen participants participated in each session
for a total of 112 participants (8 X 14). The eight sessions were combined to create the four
between-group conditions with 28 participants per condition: cash/near-future; cash/distantfuture; non-cash/near-future and non-cash/distant future. The participants, who were
undergraduate, native English speakers, were randomly selected from an online experimental
economics data base.10 Participants were randomly selected in order to obtain a representative
sample of the undergraduate student population. Each participant was randomly assigned to one
of the four between-group conditions. Participants were randomly assigned in order to ensure
that the attributes of the participants across all four conditions were similar. Four participants
were withdrawn from the total sample because they indicated on the post-experiment
questionnaire that they were not native English speakers. An additional participant was
withdrawn from the total sample because he did not complete the study. 11 The average age of the
participants was 20.6 years and is not significantly different across conditions (p = 0.86). About
54 percent of the participants were female and there were no significant gender differences
10

Participants were required to be native English language speakers because the Creative Task (Remote Associate
Test word problems) requires English language fluency.
11
The results are inferentially identical if these five participants are included in the sample.

21

across conditions (p = 0.79).12 Because there were no age and gender differences across
conditions, these demographic factors were not included in subsequent analysis.
IV. RESULTS
4.1 Validation of Operational Variables
Before analyzing the results of the experiment, the research instrument was validated.
First is validation of the incentive type manipulation. Because psychology theory indicates that
conceptual concreteness is associated with increased concerns for feasibility and practicality
(Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003), a three-item “concreteness” factor was
created consisting of how practical, useful and functional participants perceived their incentive to
be using 7-point semantic differential scales (Eigen Value = 2.47; variance explained = 82.4%).
The scales ranged from 1 (Not practical/useful/functional) to 4 (moderately
practical/useful/functional) to 7 (very practical/useful/functional).13 By regressing this factor
onto incentive type, I found that participants provided with cash incentives perceived their
incentive type to be significantly more concrete than those who received the non-cash incentives
(t = 6.06; p < 0.01, two-tailed). This result is consistent with cash incentives being
conceptualized more concretely than non-cash incentives.
Second was validation of the payoff timing manipulation. Psychological theory indicates
that near future events are conceptualized more concretely than distant future events (Trope and
Liberman 2003). To validate that participants perceived payments that are received the following
day as being closer in time than payments received six weeks later, a 7-point semantic
differential scale was used. It ranged from 1 (not near future) to 4 (moderately near future) to 7
(very near future). Results indicate that participants in the near future payoff condition perceived
12

Since this was a random assignment experiment, the likelihood of gender or any other common differences across
subjects is greatly reduced by the design itself.
13
A semantic differential scale, which uses intervals, allows parametric statistics to be used for data analysis.
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their payoffs as being significantly closer in time than participants in the distant future payoff
condition (5.72 vs. 3.07; t = 8.58; p < 0.01, two-tailed).
Third was validation of the task type manipulation. To validate that participants
perceived the decoding task as an analytic task and the Remote Associate word task as a creative
task, participants were asked to record the extent to which they believed each task required
imagination using a 7-point semantic differential scale. The scale ranged from 1 (no imagination)
to 4 (moderate imagination) to 7 (a lot of imagination). Results indicate that the Remote
Associate Test problems were perceived as requiring significantly more imagination than the
decoding problems (5.79 vs. 1.97; t = 18.59; p < 0.01, two-tailed). This result is consistent with
the Remote Associate Test problems being commonly used as a measure of creativity (Mednick
1962, Bowden and Jung-Beeman 2003).
4.2 Measures and Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used to test H1,
H2 and RQ1. As reported in Table 1 and graphed in Figure 2, analytic task performance is
directionally higher when cash incentives were paid in the near future compared to other
incentive type and payoff timing combinations (cash/near future mean = 25.48 > other
combinations). This pattern in the dependent variable is consistent with H1.
Insert Figure 2 here
Insert Table 1 here
As reported in Table 2 and graphed in Figure 3, creative task performance is directionally
higher when cash incentives are paid in the near future and when non-cash incentives are paid in
the distant future (cash/near future mean = 27.48 and non-cash/distant future mean = 27.78 >
other combinations). This pattern in the dependent variable is consistent with H2.
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Insert Figure 3 here
Insert Table 2 here
My research question evaluates whether cash incentives paid in the near future or noncash incentives paid in the distant future are associated with higher levels of creative task
performance. As reported in Table 2 and graphed in Figure 3, creative task performance is
similar regardless of whether cash incentives are paid in the near future or non-cash incentives
are paid in the distant future (27.48 vs. 27.78).
4.3 Tests of Hypotheses and Research Question
H1 predicts that, when performing an analytic task, a cash incentive paid in the near
future will be the most effective incentive type and payoff timing combination.14 To test the
effectiveness of this incentive type and payoff timing combination relative to other
combinations, planned contrasts (Buckless and Ravenscoft 1990) can be utilized. Specifically,
one assigns +3 to cash/near future, -1 to cash/distant future, -1 to non-cash/near future, and -1 to
non-cash/distant future. The dependent variable is problems solved-analytic.
As reported in Table 3-Panel A, H1 is supported (t = 2.10, p = 0.02, one-tailed).15 These
results suggest that when firms provide incentives to employees performing analytic tasks, the
most effective combination of incentive type and payoff timing is cash paid in the near future.
Insert Table 3 here
H2 predicts that, when performing a creative task, a cash incentive paid in the near future
and a non-cash incentive paid in the distant future will be the most effective incentive type and
payoff timing combinations. To evaluate the effectiveness of these incentive type and payoff
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Task order was tested and found to have an insignificant effect on performance (p > 0.32, two-tailed). Because
task order does not have an effect on performance, task order is not included in the analysis.
15
The results are inferentially identical when the cash/near-future condition is individually compared to the other
conditions.
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timing combinations relative to other combinations, planned contrasts were used again.
Specifically, one assigns +2 to cash/near future, -2 to cash/distant future, -2 to non-cash/near
future, and +2 to non-cash/distant future. The dependent variable is problems solved-creative.16
As reported in Table 3-Panel B, H2 is supported (t = 2.19, p = 0.02, one-tailed).17 These
results suggest that when firms provide incentives to employees performing creative tasks, the
most effective combinations of incentive type and payoff timing are cash incentives paid in the
near future and non-cash incentives paid in the distant future.
Finally, RQ1 investigates when performing a creative task, whether a cash incentive paid
in the near future or non-cash incentive paid in the distant future will be the most effective
incentive type and payoff timing combination. To evaluate the relative effectiveness of each
combination, their mean performance scores were compared using a t-test. The dependent
variable is problems solved-creative.
As reported in Table 3-Panel C, a non-cash incentive paid in the distant future is equally
effective as a cash incentive paid in the near future (27.78 vs. 27.48) (t = 0.16, p = 0.87, twotailed). These results suggest that when firms provide incentives to employees performing
creative tasks, either cash incentives paid in the near future or non-cash incentives paid in the
distant future are equally effective. However, to the extent that firms can provide non-cash
incentives at a lower cost than cash incentives, firms can benefit from substituting non-cash
incentives for cash.

16

The planned contrast model used to test H2 is identical to conventional ANOVA which assigns equal weights to
each condition. Planned contrasts are used to test H2 in order to be consistent with the testing of H1.
17
The results are inferentially identical when the cash incentive-near future and non-cash incentive-distant future
conditions are separately compared to the other conditions.
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4.4 Supplemental Analysis
In order to provide further evidence that the pattern of results is consistent with the theory
used in this thesis, questionnaire data collected during both the first and second sessions was
analyzed. This questionnaire data was used to assess whether participants’ perceptions of
incentive type and payoff timing predict the pattern of results found in the two dependent
variables. Questionnaire data was also used to rule out the alternative explanation that the pattern
of results was due to cash and non-cash incentives differentially crowding out participants’
intrinsic interest in the tasks. Finally, questionnaire data was used to highlight how cash
incentives paid in the near future and non-cash incentives paid in the distant future are both
positively perceived but in different ways and with different behavioral effects.
4.4.1 Perceptions of Incentive Type and Payoff Timing as Predictors of Performance
Did participants’ self-reported perceptions of incentive type and payoff timing predict the
pattern of the results found in the two dependent variables? Participants’ perceptions of incentive
type concreteness and temporal distance, which are described above, were dichotomized based
on whether they reflect a concrete or abstract orientation. These two dichotomous variables were
then matched to reflect the main theoretical constructs used in the study: concrete incentiveconcrete payoff timing; concrete incentive-abstract payoff timing; abstract incentive-concrete
payoff timing and abstract incentive-abstract payoff timing.
These matched pairs of self-reported questionnaire data were next used to predict task
performance based on the same planned contrasts that tested H1 and H2. Consistent with the
planned contrasts used to test H1, concrete incentive-concrete payoff timing was assigned +3
while concrete incentive-abstract payoff timing, abstract incentive-concrete payoff timing and
abstract incentive-abstract payoff timing were each assigned -1. Consistent with the planned
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contrasts used to test H2, concrete incentive-concrete payoff timing was assigned +2, concrete
incentive-abstract payoff timing was assigned -2, abstract incentive-concrete payoff timing was
assigned -2 and abstract incentive-abstract payoff timing is assigned +2.
The results of the planned contrasts are consistent with the theories used to motivate H1
and H2. Consistent with H1, participants who perceived their incentive type and payoff timing
most concretely demonstrated significantly higher analytic task performance (t = 1.97; p = 0.03,
one-tailed). These participants were also significantly more likely to be in the cash/near-future
condition (p < 0.01, one-tailed). Consistent with H2, participants who perceived their incentive
type and payoff timing most concretely or most abstractly had the highest level of creative task
performance while controlling for intrinsic task interestingness (t = 1.46; p = 0.07, one-tailed).
Participants in these two groups were also significantly more likely to be in either the cash/nearfuture or non-cash/distant future conditions (p < 0.01, one-tailed). These results support the
theories used to develop the hypotheses because the results indicate that task performance is
predicted by whether incentive type and payoff timing are concretely or abstractly
conceptualized.
4.4.2 Intrinsic Task Interest
In order to rule out the possibility that the pattern of results is due to the incentives
differentially crowding out intrinsic task interest, questionnaire data was employed to examine
whether intrinsic task interest varies by incentive type. Intrinsic task interest was selected
because prior research has shown that extrinsic, performance contingent rewards, such as piece
rate incentives, can decrease intrinsic motivation without providing an offsetting increase in
extrinsic motivation (Deci et al. 1999; Fessler 2003). Because the decrease in intrinsic
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motivation may not be offset by an equivalent increase in extrinsic motivation, task performance
can be negatively affected.
Participant perceptions of task interestingness was measured at the beginning and end of
the analytic and creative tasks using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1
(not interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting). Task interestingness was
measured at the beginning and end of each task to control for the effects of performance
feedback biasing participant perceptions of task interestingness. As reported in Table 4, results
indicate that beginning and ending task interestingness does not vary by incentive type (all p’s >
0.40, two-tailed). Results also indicate that the change in task interestingness does not vary by
incentive type (all p’s > 0.50, two-tailed). These results rule out the alternative explanation that
the observed differences in task performance are due to the incentives differentially crowding out
participants’ intrinsic interest in the task.
Insert Table 4 here
4.4.3 Variation in Positive Perceptions
In this section, I explore how cash incentives paid in the near future and non-cash
incentives paid in the distant future can both be perceived positively but in different ways and
with different behavioral effects. The circumstances where cash incentives paid in the near future
are perceived more positively are first examined with respect to participants’ anticipated
enjoyment, choice preferences, and bonus collection rates. Participants’ anticipated enjoyment,
which measures how enjoyable participants think it will be to use their bonuses, was measured at
the end of the first session using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not
enjoyable) to 4 (moderately enjoyable) to 7 (very enjoyable). Consistent with conventional
economic theory, first session questionnaire responses indicate that participants in the cash/ near-
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future condition anticipated enjoying their performance bonuses more than participants in the
non-cash/distant-future condition (6.04 vs. 5.15; t = 1.97, p = 0.05, two-tailed).18
Participant incentive type and payoff timing choice preferences were also measured.
Participants were asked, at the end of the second session, to make a hypothetical choice between
a cash or non-cash incentive bonus and a one day or six week payoff delay. Participants were
asked to make this hypothetical choice at the end of the second session in order to prevent the
questions from biasing participants’ responses to other questions. Results indicate that all
participants preferred cash over non-cash incentives regardless of condition (48 vs. 0). 19 Most
participants also preferred to be paid after a one day delay as opposed to a six week delay
regardless of condition (47 vs. 1; chi-square = 44.10; p < 0.01; two-tailed). These results are
consistent with conventional economic theory that suggests that employees will prefer cash paid
in the near future.
Participant incentive type and payoff timing preferences were also measured in the
second session by counting the number of participants that actually showed up to collect their
incentives bonuses. It is important to examine participants’ actual behavior because individuals
may respond differently to hypothetical vs. real choices (Smith 1991). Consistent with the
questionnaire data reported above, more participants in the cash/near-future condition collected
their bonuses than those in the non-cash/distant-future condition (96% vs. 82%; chi-square =
3.00, p = 0.08, two-tailed) although this effect was not significant at the .05 alpha protection
level.
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In order to ensure comparability between the first and second sessions, the results reported in Table 5 only contain
the responses of those participants who attended both the first and second sessions (N = 97). The first session results
for anticipated enjoyment using this reduced sample are inferentially identical to the results reported above which
are based on the entire sample (N = 107).
19
A chi-square test cannot be used to test incentive type choice preferences because participants’ preferences for
cash were constant across both conditions.
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What were the circumstances under which, if any, non-cash incentives paid in the distant
future were positively perceived? These circumstances can be identified based on psychological
theories related to anticipatory pleasure and affective information processing (Loewenstein 1987;
Kida and Smith 1995; Nowliss et al. 2004; Mercer 2005). Theories related to anticipatory
pleasure suggest that delayed consumption of desirable goods and services, such as non-cash
incentives, is likely to increase pleasure because individuals can derive utility from both
consumption and the anticipation of consumption (Loewenstein 1987; Nowliss et al. 2004).
Theories related to affective information processing suggest that as time passes, individuals will
adopt an information processing style that increasingly relies on affective-based reasoning as
opposed to cognitive-based reasoning (Kida and Smith 1995; Mercer 2005). This shift towards
affective information processing is likely to make non-cash incentives appear to be more
desirable over time because non-cash incentives are frequently chosen by firms based on their
hedonic appeal (Jeffrey 2009).
Consistent with theories of anticipatory pleasure and affective information processing,
data collected during the second session indicates that non-cash incentives become increasingly
attractive over time compared to cash incentives. Although participants in the non-cash/distantfuture condition report significantly lower levels of anticipated enjoyment at the end of the first
session, as reported in Table 5, there is no difference in anticipated enjoyment between
conditions in the second session (cash/near future: 5.81 vs. non-cash/distant future 6.18; t = 1.07,
p = 0.29, two-tailed). That those in the non-cash/distant-future condition feel increasingly
positive about their incentive bonus over time is reflected in the changes in anticipated
enjoyment between the first and second sessions. While anticipated enjoyment for participants in
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the cash/near-future condition decreased between sessions, it increased for participants in the
non-cash/distant-future condition (-0.19 vs. 0.96; t = 2.60, p = 0.02, two-tailed).
Insert Table 5 here
Participants’ positive responses to non-cash incentives paid in the distant future are also
evidenced by how frequently they anticipate thinking about their bonus. Frequency of thought,
which has been used in prior accounting studies as a measure of hedonic appeal, was measured
during the second session using a question that asks participants to estimate how frequently they
will think about using their incentive bonus on a seven-point semantic differential scale 1(not
frequently) to 4 (moderately frequently) to 7 (very frequently) (Presslee et al. 2013). The results
indicate that participants in the cash/near-future condition report that they will think about their
bonuses less frequently than participants in the non-cash/distant-future condition (4.23 vs. 5.45; t
= 2.51, p = 0.02, two-tailed).
Participants’ positive responses to incentives in the non-cash/distant-future condition
have important implications for employee satisfaction and word-of-mouth employee recruiting
(Tansuhaj et al. 1988). When employees feel positively about their company and speak highly of
their company to outsiders, potential job candidates outside the company are more likely to have
a favorable impression of the company and a desire to seek employment at the company (Cable
et al. 2000). Companies prefer to hire external job candidates, who are referred through this type
of word-of-mouth recruiting, because it is more efficient than sifting “through a pile of strangers'
resumes” (Weber and Kwoh 2013).
In order to examine whether participants in the non-cash/distant-future condition spoke
more frequently to others about their bonuses than those in the cash/near-future condition,
participants were asked in the second session to report the frequency with which they discussed
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their bonus with others. Discussion frequency was measured during the second session using a
seven-point semantic differential scale that ranged from 1 (not frequently) to 4 (moderately
frequently) to 7 (very frequently). Consistent with employees speaking positively to others about
their company, participants in the non-cash/distant-future condition discussed their incentive
bonuses more frequently with others than those in the cash/near-future condition (2.58 vs. 3.86; t
= 2.25; p = 0.03, two-tailed).20
V. CONCLUSION
This study provides evidence that the effects of incentive type on performance depends
on incentive payoff timing and task type. For an analytic task, I predicted and found evidence
that a cash incentive paid in the near future is the most effective incentive type and payoff timing
combination. This result is consistent with economic preferences and information processing
having mutually reinforcing effects on employee performance. For a creative task, I predicted
and found evidence that a cash incentive paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive paid in
the distant future are the most effective incentive type and payoff timing combinations. This
result is consistent with the independent effects of economic preferences and information
processing on employee performance.
The results of this study have important implications for firms because they can help
firms identify when non-cash incentives can be substituted for cash incentives without a
reduction in performance. It is useful for firms to know when non-cash incentives can be
substituted for cash since non-cash incentives are often less expensive than their retail cash
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Additional analysis, using the entire second session sample across all conditions (N = 97), indicates that
participants in the cash incentive condition discussed their incentive bonus less frequently than those in the non-cash
incentive condition (2.90 vs. 3.64; t=1.77, p=.08, two-tailed).This result suggests that the difference in discussion
frequency between those in the cash/near-future condition and non-cash/distant future condition is not simply due to
differences in incentive payoff timing, i.e., those paid in the near future simply had less time to discuss their bonus
with others.
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equivalents (Oyer 2008) and because non-cash incentives can attract and retain desirable
employees (Prendergast 1999; Backes-Gellner and Tuor 2010). The results of this study indicate
that non-cash incentives can be effectively substituted for cash incentives when the payoff is in
the distant future and when the employees are performing creative tasks (H2, RQ1). Moreover,
the results indicate (Supplemental Analysis) that firms may also benefit from the tendency of
employees receiving this type of bonus payment to discuss their bonuses more frequently with
others. This behavior has been identified as an important factor in word-of-mouth employee
recruiting (Tansuhaj et al. 1988; Cable et al. 2000; Weber and Kwoh 2013).
The results of the study also contribute to accounting research. It provides insight into the
effects of non-cash incentives on performance (H1, H2, RQ1) which is important because this
incentive type is widely used by firms but not well understood by researchers (Jeffrey 2009;
Long and Shields 2010; Incentive Federation 2011; Presslee et al. 2013). It also contributes to
accounting research by showing how both economic preferences and information processing
effects can affect employee performance and incentive scheme effectiveness (Bonner et al. 2000;
Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). By showing that the effect of incentive type and payoff timing on
performance depends on task type, the study provides evidence that cash paid in the near future
is not always the most effective combination (H2, RQ1) as suggested by conventional economic
theory (Samuelson 1937; Koopman 1960; Baker et al. 1988). Similarly, by showing that
incentive type and payoff timing differentially affect perceived incentive attractiveness
(Supplemental Analysis), the study highlights possible secondary benefits associated with
deferred compensation (Loewenstein 1987; Nowliss et al. 2004). Finally, this study contributes
to a growing body of research related to how creative task performance (H2, RQ1) is affected by
the use of incentives (Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010).
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Figure 2
Problems Solved-Analytic (5 Rounds)
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Variable Definitions
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash incentives.
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash.
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods.
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future.
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after
their session.
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word
problems.
Problems Solved is equals the total number of problems that were solved over the five periods in each
task.
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Figure 3
Problems Solved-Creative (5 Rounds)
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Variable Definitions
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash incentives.
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash.
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods.
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future.
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after
their session.
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word
problems.
Problems Solved is equals the total number of problems that were solved over the five periods in each
task.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics-Analytic Task
(Mean and Standard Deviation)
Cash Incentives
Near Future
Distant Future
(n=27)
(n=27)

Non-cash Incentives
Near Future
Distant Future
(n=26)
(n=27)

Round 1

4.59
(1.37)

4.07
(1.49)

4.12
(1.48)

4.41
(0.93)

Round 2

4.74
(0.94)

4.81
(1.33)

4.65
(1.26)

5.07
(1.11)

Round 3

5.30
(1.10)

4.93
(1.44)

4.88
(1.31)

4.74
(1.16)

Round 4

5.37
(1.01)

4.96
(1.19)

4.31
(1.32)

4.74
(1.13)

Round 5

5.48
(1.12)

4.93
(1.36)

4.65
(1.26)

4.44
(1.01)

Total Problems
Solved

25.48
(4.07)

23.70
(5.66)

22.62
(5.10)

23.41
(4.22)

Variable Definitions
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives.
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash.
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods.
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future.
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after
their session.
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word
problems.
Problems Solved is the number of problem correctly solved.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics-Creative Task
(Mean and Standard Deviation)
Cash Incentives
Near Future
Distant Future
(n=27)
(n=27)

Non-cash Incentives
Near Future
Distant Future
(n=26)
(n=27)

Round 1

5.15
(1.73)

5.00
(2.27)

4.42
(2.37)

5.33
(2.04)

Round 2

5.00
(1.69)

4.85
(1.59)

4.62
(2.17)

5.37
(2.24)

Round 3

5.85
(2.09)

5.26
(1.91)

5.00
(2.17)

5.44
(2.04)

Round 4

5.89
(1.81)

5.19
(1.50)

4.73
(1.61)

5.85
(1.54)

Round 5

5.59
(2.18)

4.85
(1.82)

5.35
(1.98)

5.78
(1.81)

Total Problems
Solved

27.48
(6.24)

25.15
(6.85)

24.12
(7.92)

27.78
(7.14)

Variable Definitions
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives .
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash.
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods.
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future.
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after
their session.
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word
problems.
Problems Solved is the number of problem correctly solved.
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TABLE 3
Test of Hypotheses and Research Question
Panel A: H1: Problems Solved-Analytic Task (Rounds 1-5)
Value of
Contrast*
6.72

Standard
Error
3.21

t

Df

2.10

103

Significance
(1-tailed)
.02

Panel B: H2: Problems Solved-Creative Task (Rounds 1-5)
Value of
Contrast**
11.99

Standard
Error
5.46

t

Df

2.19

103

Significance
(1-tailed)
.02

Panel C: RQ1: Total Problems Solved-Creative Task- (Rounds 1-5)
(Cash Incentives-Near Future vs. Non-cash Incentives-Distant Future)
Mean
Difference
.30

Standard
Error
Difference
1.83

t

Df

Significance
(2-tailed)

.16

52

.87

Variable Definitions
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives.
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash.
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods.
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future.
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after
their session.
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word
problems.
Problems Solved is equals the total number of problems that were solved over the five periods in each
task.
*Contrast coefficients are 3 for Cash Incentives-Near Future, -1 for Cash-Distant Future, -1 for Non-cash
Incentives -Near Future and -1 for Non-cash Incentives -Distant Future.
**Contrast coefficients are 2 for Cash Incentives-Near Future, -2 for Cash-Distant Future, -2 for Noncash Incentives-Near Future and 2 for Non-cash Incentives-Distant Future.
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TABLE 4
Intrinsic Task Interest
(Mean and Standard Deviation)
Cash Incentives
Near Future
Distant Future
(n=27)
(n=27)

Non-cash Incentives
Near Future
Distant Future
(n=26)
(n=27)

Analytic Task
Interest-Begin

3.56
(2.49)

3.74
(2.07)

3.31
(2.09)

3.48
(2.19)

Analytic Task
Interest-End

3.63
(2.34)

3.56
(2.21)

3.38
(1.96)

3.19
(2.19)

Creative Task
Interest-Begin

5.67
(2.09)

4.52
(2.28)

5.50
(1.86)

4.74
(1.81)

Creative Task
Interest-End

5.63
(1.98)

4.89
(1.93)

5.54
(1.88)

5.41
(1.74)

Variable Definitions
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives.
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash.
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods.
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future.
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after
their session.
Analytic Task Interest-Begin is measured at the beginning of the analytic task after participants have
performed several practice problems but have not received performance feedback. It assesses how
interesting the analytic task is to participants using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges
from 1 (not interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting).
Analytic Task Interest-End is measured at the end of the analytic task after participants have completed all
five performance rounds and received performance feedback. It assesses how interesting the analytic
task is to participants using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not
interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting).
Creative Task Interest-Begin is measured at the beginning of the creative task after participants have
performed several practice problems but have not received performance feedback. It assesses how
interesting the creative task is to participants using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges
from 1 (not interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting).
Creative Task Interest-End is measured at the end of the creative task after participants have completed
all five performance rounds and received performance feedback. It assesses how interesting the
creative task is to participants using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not
interesting) to 4 (moderately interesting) to 7 (very interesting).
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TABLE 5
Responses to Post-Experiment Questions
(Mean and Standard Deviation)
Cash Incentives
Near Future
Distant Future
(n=26)*
(n=26)*

Non-cash Incentives
Near Future
Distant Future
(n=23)*
(n=22)*

Anticipated
EnjoymentSession 1

6.00
(1.47)

6.08
(1.35)

5.35
(1.70)

5.23
(1.85)

Anticipated
EnjoymentSession 2

5.81
(1.33)

6.23
(1.14)

5.91
(1.16)

6.18
(1.05)

Future
Thinking

4.23
(1.86)

4.96
(1.54)

4.91
(2.02)

5.45
(1.44)

Discuss with
Others

2.58
(2.02)

3.23
(1.93)

3.43
(2.31)

3.86
(1.91)

Variable Definitions
Incentive Type is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Cash Incentives and Non-cash Incentives.
Participants in the Cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of cash.
Participants in the Non-cash Incentive condition are provided performance bonuses consisting of
Lifestyle Reward points. Lifestyle Reward points can be redeemed at AMC Theaters, Cheesecake
Factory and Dick’s Sporting Goods.
Payoff Timing is manipulated between subjects at two levels: Near Future and Distant Future.
Participants in the Near Future payoff condition receive their performance bonus on the day after their
session. Participants in the Distant Future condition receive their performance bonus 6 weeks after
their session.
Task Type is manipulated within subjects at two levels: Analytic Task and Creative Task. Analytic Task
consists of alpha-numeric decoding problems. Creative Task consists of Remote Associate Test word
problems.
Anticipated Enjoyment-Session 1 is measured in the post-experiment questionnaire at the end of Session
1. It measures how much the participants anticipate that they will enjoy using their incentive bonus
using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not enjoyable) to 4 (moderately
enjoyable) to 7 (very enjoyable).
Anticipated Enjoyment-Session 2 is measured in the post-experiment questionnaire at the end of Session
2. It measures how much the participants anticipate that they will enjoy using their incentive bonus
using a seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not enjoyable) to 4 (moderately
enjoyable) to 7 (very enjoyable).
Future Thinking is measured in the post-experiment questionnaire at the end of Session 2. It measures
how frequently the participants anticipate that they will think about using their incentive bonus using a
46

seven-point semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not frequently) to 4 (moderately frequently)
to 7 (very frequently).
Discuss With Others is measured in the post-experiment questionnaire at the end of Session 2. It measures
how frequently the participants discussed their incentive bonus with others using a seven-point
semantic differential scale that ranges from 1 (not frequently) to 4 (moderately frequently) to 7 (very
frequently).
* n consists of those participants that showed-up for the second session and responded to the second postexperiment questionnaire.
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Appendix A
Incentive Bonus Description-Cash
Participation in today’s session qualifies you for a cash performance bonus. For every correctly
solved problem, you earn a $1 cash credit. You can earn a maximum performance bonus of $45
in cash. The performance bonus will be paid tomorrow/6 weeks from now during the second
session or at a later date that is convenient to you. Further information about the second session
will be provided at the end of today’s session.
Your performance bonus will be based on how well you perform of one of the two tasks in
today’s session. The task that is used to determine your bonus will be randomly selected at the
end of today’s session. Because the task that is used to calculate the bonus is randomly selected,
it is important to exert effort while performing both tasks.
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Incentive Bonus Description-Non-Cash
Participation in today’s session qualifies you for a Lifestyle Rewards performance bonus.
Lifestyle Rewards are store credits that can be used to make retail purchases related to
entertainment, specialty foods and recreation. The performance bonus will be paid tomorrow/6
weeks from now during the second session or at a later date that is convenient to you. Further
information about the second session will be provided at the end of today’s session.
For every correctly solved problem, you earn one Lifestyle Rewards credit. Each Lifestyle
Rewards credit has a $1 retail value. You can earn a maximum performance bonus of 45
Lifestyle Rewards credits. You can redeem your Lifestyle Rewards at AMC Theaters,
Cheesecake Factory and Dick’ Sporting Goods.
Your performance bonus will be based on how well you perform of one of the two tasks in
today’s session. The task that is used to determine your bonus will be randomly selected at the
end of today’s session. Because the task that is used to calculate the bonus is randomly selected,
it is important to exert effort while performing both tasks.

`
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Appendix B
Task Screenshot-Analytic
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Task Screenshot-Creative
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